Mercer Law Review
Volume 51
Number 3 Lead Articles Edition - 1999-2000
Oliver Wendell Holmes Symposium and
Lectureship: The Marketplace of Ideas in
Cyberspace

Article 12

5-2000

Wyoming v. Houghton: Passengers' Belongings Subject to
Searches Under the "Automobile Exception" to the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Requirements
Theresa H. Hammond

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Hammond, Theresa H. (2000) "Wyoming v. Houghton: Passengers' Belongings Subject to Searches Under
the "Automobile Exception" to the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirements," Mercer Law Review: Vol.
51 : No. 3 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol51/iss3/12

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Wyoming v. Houghton: Passengers'
Belongings Subject to Searches Under the
"Automobile Exception" to the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Requirement

In Wyoming v. Houghton' the United States Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of conducting a warrantless search of a container
under the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. The Court held that when police officers have probable
cause to search a vehicle, they may also search any container found in
the car, including passengers' belongings, that are capable of concealing
the object of the search.2
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While driving during the early morning of July 23, 1995, David Young
was stopped by a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer for speeding and
driving with a faulty brake light. Young's girlfriend and Sandra
Houghton, the respondent, were also in the front seat of the car.' The
officer saw a syringe in Young's shirt pocket, so he ordered Young to step
out of the car and place the syringe on its hood. When Young admitted,
"with refreshing candor," that he used the syringe to take drugs, the
4
officer ordered the women out of the car and asked for identification.
Houghton claimed to be "Sandra Jones" and said she did not have any
identification."
The officer then searched the passenger compartment of the car for
contraband. From the back seat, he removed a purse containing

1. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
2. Id. at 307.
3. Id. at 297-98. Houghton's purse, the object of the search, was on the back seat. Id.
at 298.
4. Id.
5. Id. The officer conducted a "pat down" of all three occupants "to see if there were
any weapons or anything." Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1998). In
dictum the state supreme court questioned the propriety of the search under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), but the issue was not raised on appeal. Id. at 365 n.1.
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Houghton's driver's license, and Houghton admitted the purse was hers.
The officer continued to search the purse and discovered two wallet-like
bags containing drugs and drug paraphernalia, some of which Houghton
acknowledged to be hers.6 She was then arrested.7
The trial judge denied Houghton's motion to suppress the evidence
found in her purse because under California v. Acevedo,' the officer had
probable cause to search the car for contraband and could, therefore,
search any container in the car that might conceal contraband. A jury
convicted Houghton of felony possession of a controlled substance, and
she was sentenced to between two and three years in prison.9
On appeal the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed Houghton's
conviction.' Without questioning the officer's probable cause to search
the vehicle for contraband, the court held that "separate probable
cause" is necessary to search a passenger's belongings under the "notice
test" it adopted: If the officer "knows or should know that a container
is the personal effect of a passenger who is not suspected of criminal
activity," the container is not within the permissible scope of the
search.' 2 Unless the officer had reason to believe an opportunity
existed to place the contraband in the passenger's belongings in order to
avoid detection, a warrantless search of a passenger's personal possessions was unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 14 and reversed, holding that
police officers who have probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband may also inspect any passengers' belongings that are capable of
concealing the targeted contraband. 5

6.

526 U.S. at 298. A brown wallet-type bag contained a syringe, 60 cubic centimeters
Houghton denied knowing how

("ccs") of methamphetamine, and other drug paraphernalia.

it got into her purse but admitted the black wallet, also containing a syringe, drug
paraphernalia, and 10 ccs of methamphetamine, belonged to her. Id.
7. Id. She was charged under state law with felony possession of methamphetamine
in a liquid amount greater than three-tenths of a gram. Id.
8. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
9. 956 P.2d at 365.
10. Id. at 372.
11. Id. at 366-67. The court cited United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) and
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570, for the proposition that the scope of the search is determined by
the probable cause upon which the search is predicated. 956 P.2d at 366.
12. Id. at 372.
13. Id.
14. Wyoming v. Houghton, 524 U.S. 983 (1998).
15. 526 U.S. at 307.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The so-called "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's"
warrant requirement has its basis in Carroll v. United States,17 a case
involving the transportation of bootleg whiskey in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. 8 The Court in Carroll held that a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile are valid if the police have
reasonable cause, arising from known circumstances, to believe that the
vehicle contains illegal contraband that may lawfully be seized and
destroyed." While emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment guarantee
is to protect against only unreasonable searches or seizures,2 ° the Court
concluded that this guarantee, "practically since the beginning of the
government," has been construed to recognize an essential difference
between searches of dwellings and other buildings, which require a
warrant, and searches of vehicles "where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant."2 The impracticability of obtaining a search warrant can
be attributed to the mobile nature of automobiles, which "can be quickly
moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
22
sought."

Thus, Carroll gave birth to the automobile exception on the basis that
the mobility of a vehicle creates an exigent circumstance that evidence
of illegal activity may be destroyed if law enforcement officers are
required to obtain a warrant before searching. This rationale was
extended in Chambers v. Maroney," in which evidence was discovered
during a warrantless search of a car after it had been taken to the police
station following the arrest of its occupants. 24 The Court held that the
automobile exception applied because the officers would have been

16. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
18. Id. at 134.
19. Id. at 149.
20. Id. at 146.
21. Id. at 153.
22. Id.
23. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
24. Id. at 44.
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justified in conducting an immediate search based on probable cause.25
Perhaps most significantly, the Court held that the alternative to an
immediate warrantless search-seizing the car until a warrant may be
obtained-is equally intrusive, and both courses of action are reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.26
The Court seemed to recognize the limitations of the exigent circumstance/mobility theory when both the driver and the car are in police
custody; thus, in Cardwell v. Lewis,27 the Court announced another
rationale for distinguishing the search of an automobile from that of
one's person or home-the diminished expectation of privacy a person
has in a vehicle. 28 This diminished expectation of privacy exists for
several reasons. First, automobiles are forms of transportation and,
therefore, "seldom serve[] as one's residence or as the repository of
Second, automobile travel occurs on "public
personal effects."'
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." ° Finally, state regulation of automobiles through registration,
driver's license, and operation requirements, as well as inspections and
situations in which police must take cars into custody in the interest of
public safety, also reduce a person's privacy expectations in relation to
the vehicle. 3
This theory became the basis for the Court's decision in United States
v. Chadwick3 2 in which the Court had to determine whether the
automobile exception allowing warrantless searches and seizures applied
to containers within the vehicle.3" The Court held that luggage,
although mobile, did not involve a diminished expectation of privacy as

25. Id. at 52. The Court distinguished the warrantless probable cause search from a
search incident to arrest stating, "'The right to search and the validity of the seizure are
not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the
seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.'"
Id. at 49 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158-59).
26. Id. at 52.
27. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
28. Id. at 590.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). See also Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
32. 433 U.S. 1 (1977), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
33.

See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT § 7.2(a), at 461 (3d ed. 1996). The author of this treatise claims that "[i]t was
generally assumed that the entire interior of the vehicle was subject to a warrantless
search incident to the arrest of the driver" until Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752 (1969),
limited the scope of this rationale. LAFAFE, supra. Thus, the "potential reach of the
Carroll doctrine suddenly became important." Id.
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did an automobile; thus, the officers' warrantless search of a locked
footlocker placed in the trunk of a car was unreasonable.34
Two years later, in Arkansas v. Sanders,3 5 the Court distinguished
between warrantless searches of "some integral part of the automobile,"
such as the glove compartment,3 6 trunk,37 or dashboard,' and searches of luggage taken from the vehicle.3 9 Although the Court held that
a warrantless search of luggage taken from a lawfully stopped vehicle
was invalid,' it suggested that "[n]ot all containers and packages ...
will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment."4
This language quickly became the basis for defending searches of
containers based on their nature. The Court in Robbins v. California42
held that because the package containing the brick of marijuana did not
"clearly announce its contents ... [so] that its contents are obvious to an
observer," the search was unreasonable." Ironically, in an opinion
decided the same day as Robbins, the Court upheld the warrantless
search of the passenger compartment of a car, specifically the pocket of
a passenger's jacket found on the back seat."
At this point, the Court appeared hopelessly fractured in its decisions
regarding the extent of the automobile exception. As Justice Powell
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Robbins, "The Court apparently
cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone on how these
cases should be decided." 5 The difficulty seemed to lie in the overlap
among cases involving automobile searches incident to arrest, those in
which the officers had probable cause to search a specific container
within a vehicle, and those in which probable cause existed to search the
vehicle and any containers that happened to be inside."

34. 433 U.S. at 13.
35. 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled by Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 565.
36. 442 U.S. at 763 (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 366).
37. Id. (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 437).
38. Id. (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 765.
41. Id. at 764 n.13.
42. 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (stating in a plurality opinion, "Once placed within such
a [closed, opaque] container, a diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth
Amendment.").
43. Id. at 428.
44. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981). The search of defendant's jacket
was incident to his arrest for possession of marijuana. Id.
45. 453 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring).

46. Id
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The next year, the Court addressed the latter issue in United States
v. Ross 47 and held that police officers who have probable cause may
search a vehicle to the same extent as a warrant would allow, and this
search may include "any movable container that is believed to be
carrying an illicit substance." The Court distinguished Chadwick and
Sanders on the basis that in neither case did the police have probable
cause to search the entire vehicle because they believed the specific
container itself held contraband and its placement in the vehicle was
merely coincidental.49
Further, the Court noted that if it was reasonable for the police in
Carroll to rip open the car seat during its warrantless search for
whiskey, it was reasonable to open a brown paper bag and a leather
pouch.' Contraband, the Court noted, is "rarely... strewn across the
trunk or floor of a car."5' By its nature, it is enclosed in containers to
shield it from public view.52 Because a warrant would allow the police
to search any place in the automobile that might hide the object of the
search, "nice distinctions between.., glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages ... must give way to the interest
in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand."58 Ross
further emphasized that distinctions based on the nature of the
container as "worthy" or "unworthy," as suggested by Sanders, were
improper; rather, the rule regarding the scope of the automobile search
"applies equally to all containers.'
The Court's failure in Ross to overrule Chadwick and Sanders led to
confusion among the lower courts.55 But in Acevedo, the Court rejected
the Chadwick-Sanders distinction between "a container for which the
police are specifically searching and a container which they come across
in a car." Such a distinction is based on coincidence57 and results in
less effective law enforcement with no enhanced protection of privacy

47. 456 U.s. 798 (1982).

48. Id. at 809.
49. Id. at 814.
50. Id. at 818.
51. Id. at 820.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 821.
54. Id. at 822.
55. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 578 ("'he fact that the state courts and the Federal Courts
of Appeals have been reversed in their Fourth Amendment holdings 29 times since 1982
further demonstrates the extent to which our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
confused the courts.").
56. Id. at 574.
57. Id. at 580.
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interests." Thus, the Court held that police may, with probable cause,
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and any containers
therein that may conceal the suspected contraband. 9 The broad
language of Ross andAcevedo, which emphasized reasonableness and deemphasized the need for a warrant, 6° was tested in Wyoming v.
Houghton in which the container belonged to a passenger.
III. COURT'S RATIONALE
In a six to three majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Houghton.61 Applying both
the mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy rationales, the
Court held that police officers who have probable cause to search an
automobile may search a passenger's belongings found inside the vehicle
if the container might conceal the object of the search.62
The Court conducted a two-step inquiry for determining whether a
governmental action violates the Fourth Amendment: (1) Would the
Framers have regarded the particular action as an unlawful search or
seizure, and (2) when this cannot be gleaned, does this intrusion upon
one's privacy outweigh the legitimate governmental interest promoted
by the action under traditional standards of reasonableness?"
Applying the reasonableness standard in response to the first inquiry,
the majority cited Carroll for the proposition that the Framers would
have regarded warrantless searches of containers within a vehicle as
reasonable if probable cause existed to believe the vehicle contained
contraband." The Court relied upon its findings in Ross that customs
officials would have had to look inside cartons and boxes in their search65
for smuggled goods rather than relying on the exterior appearance.
In addition, the majority noted that Ross did not limit the application of

58. Id. at 576.
59. Id. at 580.
60. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Acevedo noted that the Fourth Amendment
does not require a warrant prior to searches and seizures; rather, it forbids unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Scalia
indicated that in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court had wavered between a
strict warrant requirement and a reasonableness inquiry. Id. at 582-83. The many
exceptions to the warrant requirement reveal that tension still exists between the two
clauses of the Amendment.
61. 526 U.S. at 307.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 299-300.
64. Id. at 300.
65. Id. at 300-01 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26).

1006

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

its rule to drivers, nor did its historical evidence indicate such a limitation."
After determining that the first prong of its inquiry was satisfied, the
Court continued its analysis under the second prong and announced that
"the balancing of the relative interests weighs decidedly in favor of
allowing searches of a passenger's belongings." 7 Like drivers, passengers have diminished expectations of privacy in an automobile so that
an intrusion is relatively minimal.'
The Court distinguished this
intrusion from that which occurs during searches of one's person and
concluded that "[s]uch traumatic consequences are not to be expected
when the police examine an item of personal property found in a car." 9
Thus, a minimal intrusion is reasonable if based on probable cause.
On the other hand, the majority concluded that a substantial burden
would be placed upon law enforcement if passengers' belongings were to
be protected from searches for contraband based on probable cause.70
Although the Court recognized the potential for destroying evidence
while the police obtain a warrant, it was more concerned with the
passenger's role in secreting the contraband. 7 The Court found that
an officer may reasonably assume a passenger is "engaged in a common
enterprise with the driver."72 If the Court did create a "passenger's
property" exception to the container search, contraband would never be
discovered because the "passenger-confederate" would claim that all
containers in the car belong to him rather than to the driver.7 3 Even
if the passenger is innocent of criminal activity, the driver may still have
hidden contraband in the passenger's belongings.74
Furthermore, the Court rejected the Wyoming Supreme Court's notice
test as being unworkable.7" As a practical matter, a "passenger
exception" would lead to increased litigation regarding the proper basis
for determining what an officer should reasonably have known about a
passenger's possible ownership of a container within the car.76
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that
a notice test would "destroy the workability of the bright-line rule"

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 301.
Id. at 303.
Id. (citing Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590).
Id.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id. (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 101-02 (1980)).
Id.
Id.
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articulated in Ross, and he emphasized the limited scope of the
holding. 7 Justice Breyer also suggested that had Houghton's purse
would have deserved
actually been "attached to her person," she
7
increased protection for her privacy interest.
In a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for "creating" a new rule based on a distinction of
where the property was located rather than "adhering to the settled
distinction between drivers and passengers."79 The dissent further
indicated that by not requiring probable cause specific to the passenger
or her purse, the majority made the unwarranted assumption that a
passenger and a driver are "partners in crime" based on "mere spatial
association."' Furthermore, rather than viewing the privacy intrusion
as minimal based on diminished expectations, the dissenting Justices
said the intrusion more closely resembled a search of one's person."
Thus, the burden placed on law enforcement officers to have probable
cause for each item or person searched is reasonable in relation to the
serious intrusion of privacy imposed by the warrantless search of a
passenger's belongings.8 2
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court's decision in Houghton is surprising, not because of the
result, but because of its quiet brevity. In an opinion spanning merely
eight pages, the Court has changed its position, held not long ago,
rejecting the "suggestion that this 'automobile exception' somehow
justifies the warrantless search of a closed container found inside an
automobile."' Instead, it announced that police may search a woman's
purse if she happens to be riding in a car with a person who, when
stopped for a traffic violation, presents police with probable cause to
believe he has illegal contraband somewhere in the car.
As with all constitutional issues, the Court must balance the rights of
individuals with those of society. The Court has consistently acknowl-

77. Id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring). See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the
United States Supreme Court at 30-31, 36-37, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)
(98-184) (demonstrating the Court's interest in maintaining a simple, bright-line rule that
is easily understood and applied).
78. 526 U.S. at 308. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (holding that
a permissible warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause does not extend
to its occupants).
79. 526 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 310.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 310-11.
83. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 424.
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edged the need to provide law enforcement agents with a clear framework within which they can operate to protect themselves as well as the
public." However, in effectively divorcing the warrant requirement
from the remainder of the Fourth Amendment and focusing only on the
standard of reasonableness in searches involving personal belongings in
automobiles, the Court has given law enforcement enormous discretion. 5
Houghton extends the already widely drawn parameters for searches
and seizures without a warrant based on traffic violations, regardless of
whether the stop is merely a pretext for investigation of criminal
activity.8 " Officers are authorized to order passengers (as well as
drivers) out of an automobile even when the officer's safety is not at
issue and there is no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.8 "
Therefore, the decision to allow police to search a passenger's purse or
other belongings, when probable cause exists to believe the items may
hide contraband, is hardly shocking.
Still, Houghton raises some interesting questions about individual
privacy. As Justice Breyer indicated in his concurring opinion, the
Court's decision in this case leaves open the question of whether the
police could conduct a search of a woman's purse if it were attached to
her person. 8 The location of the container would seem to make a
difference. Houghton seems to suggest that if a wallet were on the seat
next to its owner, the police may search it; however, if it were inside the
owner's pocket, a search would be prohibited without particularized
probable cause. 9
Other such questions predominated at the oral arguments in
Houghton. What if the owner grabbed her purse as she exited the car?
What if she dropped it while getting out of the car? Could the police

84.

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30 (1968) (holding that a lesser standard

than probable cause-reasonable, articulable suspicion-would suffice for a seizure and a
subsequent pat down of outer clothing for weapons).
85. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the United States Supreme Court at 1920, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (98-184) (suggesting the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard provides an appropriate distinction between
searches of persons and those of property).
86. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that the reasonableness of traffic stops is not dependent upon the actual motivation of the officer making the
stop).
87. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (extending Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)).
88. 526 U.S. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. In such a situation, Di Re would be controlling. See supra note 81.
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order her to leave her purse in the car? 9° And in deciding these issues
in future cases, will the Court be led back into the quagmire of
distinguishing between worthy and unworthy containers-a wallet or
purse attached to the person is protected, but not a briefcase, satchel, or
paper bag? When these issues appear before the Court, Justice Breyer's
opinion suggests the result will not be another six-three majority.
What becomes abundantly clear from Houghton is the Court's belief
that having a bright-line test to guide law enforcement activity and to
-protect police from possible harm is reasonable in relation to the
minimal intrusion on individual privacy. How far that line may shift
before the intrusion becomes substantial remains uncertain.
THERESA H. HAMMOND

90. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the United States Supreme Court at 5-6,
12-16, 19-24, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (98-184).

